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Soft Ground Tunnel Failures in Michigan 
Jerome C. Neyer 
Principal, Neyer, Tiseo & Hlndo, Ltd. 
SYNOPSIS Three failures of non-reinforced concrete tunnels in Michigan have been investigated. 
Descriptions of the failures have been presented, together with geotechnical data for the sites. A 
probable failure mechanism has been described, as well as design concepts which need to be considered 
on future projects. Finally, construction procedures to be specified as part of the design process 
have been evaluated. 
INTRODUCTION 
During the period from 1977 through 1980, three 
separate tunnel failures occurred in the suburbs 
of Detroit, Michigan. All three failures occur-
red some time after the tunnel had been bored 
and lined with concrete. Although the sites of 
the individual projects are several miles apart 
(See Figure 1), all are within a common geologic 
setting. Since there are definite similarities 
among the failures, a study has been undertaken 
to establish common design and/or construction 
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Fig. 1. Vicinity Map 
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The geologic setting is near the terminal 
moraines of the Wisconsin glaciation in this 
region. Bedrock is at considerable depth, 
probably in excess of 150 feet. Overlying 
the shale or limestone bedrock is glacial till 
or deltaic deposits associated with early 
Wisconsin or late Illionoian glaciation. This 
formation includes very compact fine sands, 
silty sands and sandy silts. These soils are in 
turn overlain by desicated glacial lake clays 
or more recent glacial outwash. 
The regional groundwater level slopes downward 
to the southeast. Lake St. Clair and the St. 
Clair River have water surfaces in the range of 
Elevation 570 to 580. The groundwater level at 
the three sites being studied is in the range of 
Elevation 570 to 585. Due to the presence 
of the impermeable glacial lake clays above the 
older till and deltaic deposits, the lower 
aquifer is under artesian pressure. 
I-696 TUNNEL 
The design of Interstate Highway 696 in 
Roseville, Michigan required a large diameter 
tunnel to carry storm water from the depressed 
freeway to Lake St. Clair. This tunnel was 
constructed under several separate contracts in 
1976 through 1978. The 2 mile stretch from 
Hayes Road to Nieman Road was to be 102 inches 
in diameter with the invert at approximately 
Elevation 550. 
Soil conditions at the project location were 
investigated by the drilling of test borings 
along the alignment. Figure 2 gives a gener-
alized profile of subsurface conditions in the 
area where the failure eventually occurred. The 
contact between the upper impermeable clays and 
the lower water-bearing sands varied from several 
feet above the crown of the tunnel to several 
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Fig. 2. I-696 Tunnel Soil Profile 
During construction, dewatering wells were 
installed by the contractor to lower the 
artesian head in the aquifer. A wheel-type 
tunnel boring machine (TBM) was used to exca-
vate the tunnel. Circular steel ribs and tim-
ber lagging provided the primary ground support 
with monolithic non-reinforced concrete used 
for the secondary lining. Mining was completed 
prior to commencement of concrete lining place-
ment. No unusual problems were noted during the 
construction of the tunnel. 
After a sinificant portion of the tunnel had 
been mined, concreted, and accepted by the 
project owner, ground settlement over the tunnel 
was noted in several places. Subsequent in-
vestigation disclosed that the tunnel had 
settled as much as 6 inches, had developed 
cracks, and was partially filled with sand. 
Three sections of tunnel, each approximately 
150 to 200 feet in length were replaced by 
deep open cut excavation techniques. In addi-
tion, many of the construction joints which 
were formed without waterstops were grouted to 
stop inflow of water and potential inflow of 
soil in other areas. 
The cost of this remedial action is reported 
to have been approximately $10 million and 
litigation between the project owner and the 
contractor is continuing as of the date of 
this paper. 
ROMEO ARM INTERCEPTOR 
During the late 1960's and the 1970's, a major 
expansion of Detroit's regional sewerage col-
l.ection and treatment system took place. 
This expansion included large diameter inter-
ceptor tunnels extending to the northerly 
suburbs. One of these tunnels, the Romeo Arm 
Interceptor, ran along 15 Mile Road at a depth 
of approximately 55 to 70 feet. 
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Figure 3 presents a generalized profile of 
subsurface conditions along the Romeo Arm 
Interceptor. The upper clay soils are heavily 
overconsolidated and the lower granular soils 
are in a very compact state. The contact 
between the impermeable upper soils and the 
artesian aquifer varies from below the tunnel 
invert to above the tunnel crown. 
e3o'r--------------------------------------,&3o 
APPROXIMATE GROUND SURFACE ELEVATION 1 
810t=~==~====~----~~~~~~~~1810 
MEDIUM TO STIFF MOTTLED BROWN GRAY SILTY CLAY 
590r----------=~~~~~==~~~-----,590 i~ 
: 570 • WATER EVEL VERY STIFF TO HARD SILTY CLAY 570 ~ 55oli.}j'':·}'·~~,:;;;:L}/:"1Jt'•,,\. b .••• _, ;'\•·· • ·t1\~~~~~·•••" 
I--
550 
VERY COMPACT GRAY FINE SAND 530~--------~~~----------------------_,530 
510L-----~V~E~R~Y~H~AR==D~G~RA~Y~S~A~N~D~Y~C~L~A~Y_EY __ S_IL_T ______ ~510 
Fig. 3. Romeo Arm Soil Profile 
The tunnel was constructed in 1972 and 1973 
using a tunnel boring machine (TBM) equipped 
with an hydraulically operated digger arm. 
Deep well dewatering was used to lower the 
groundwater level in advance of the mining 
operation. Most of the tunnel was constructed 
under compressed air with pressures being in 
the range of 6 to 10 pounds per square inch 
(psi). The primary lining was constructed of 
steel ribs and timber lagging with a mono-
lithic concrete lining placed as the mining 
progressed. Although difficult mining condi-
tions were noted, there was no evidence of 
unresolved construction problems. 
In 1978, a contract to connect a local sewer to 
the tunnel was awarded by the City of Fraser, 
Michigan. The contractor was required to ex-
cavate a shaft to the tunnel and to connect a 
drop to an eye in the existing tunnel at a dep·th 
of approximately 60 feet. A limited number of 
dewatering wells were installed and the excava-
tion reportedly encountered very wet soils as it 
advanced into the sand layer. It is believed 
that the unbalanced hydrostatic head in the soil 
resulted in upward flow of soil into the shaft 
excavation. This theory is supported by the 
observation that the contractor removed soil foi 
several days without the shaft getting any 
deeper. 
On July 29,. 1978, the tunnel collapsed in the 
immediate vicinity of the shaft. Since this 
sewer served an area of more than 55 square 
miles,· its collapse presented a major threat to 
the environment and the health of the local 
residents. An emergency by-pass of the failed 
section was installed by contractors retained by 
the City of Detroit Water and Sewerage Depart-
ment. As shown on Figure 4, this emergency 
repair required mobilization of considerable 
equipment and personnel •. 
Fig. 4. Emergency Repair at Romeo Arm 
In order to stop inflow of soils into the rup-
tured tunnel, a program of dewatering and grout 
injection was initiated. It was know that it 
would take at least several weeks to lower 
the level of the grounwater to a point below 
the tunnel. Pumping of cement-based grout, 
however, proved effective in halting the pro-
gressive collapse of the system within 7 days. 
Dewatering wells were able to eventually lower 
the groundwater level to below the tunnel. 
The cost of the emergency repairs to the 
collapsed interceptor was approximately $15 
million. The permanent repair of this stretch 
of tunnel is presently underway and is esti-
mated to cost approximately $5 million. 
CORRIDOR INTERCEPTOR 
The sewage flow from the Romeo Arm Interceptor 
joins with flow from eastern Oakland County 
and is conveyed toward the Detroit Wastewater 
Treatment Plant through the Corridor Inter-
ceptor. This 12-foot 9-inch sewer was con-
structed during the period from 1970 through 
1972. As shown on Figure 5, the generalized 
soil profile for this tunnel is geologically 
similar to that at the previously discussed 
tunnels. However, at this location, a stratum 
of compact silt was encountered between the 
upper cohesive soils and the lower granular 
soils. 
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This tunnel was constructed with a wheel-type 
TBM. Deep wells were drilled to lower the 
groundwater level during the initial construc-
t~on. The dewatering was reportedly effec-
tlve and the use of compressed air to prevent 
water inflow was not necessary. Steel ribs 
and timber lagging were installed for primary 
support. The secondary lining of monolithic-
poured non-reinforced concrete was placed 
after most of the tunnelling had been 
completed. 
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Fig. 5. Corridor Interceptor Soil Profile 
After being put into service in July of 1972, 
no problems were reported with the tunnel 
until January of 1980. During a walking 
inspection of the tunnel on January 27, 1980, 
three separate areas of structural distress 










In the worst area, the tunnel had settled appro-
ximately 3 feet and the concrete secondary 
lining had fallen out, exposing the steel ribs 
and timber lagging. Total collapse of the 
tunnel appeared to be imminent. 
The emergency procedures used to divert the 
flow around the distressed areas were similar 
to those used on the Romeo Arm project. 
However, in order to prevent further collapse 
of the tunnel during repair operations, the 
soil immediately above the worst distress area 
was frozen with a liquid nitrogen system. 
When the flow was finally diverted from the 
tunnel, the area of the worst distress 
appeared as shown in Figure 6. 
The permanent repair of the Corridor Inter-
ceptor was accomplished by jacking a 9-foot 
inside diameter reinforced concrete pipe 
through the distressed areas . The annular 
space between the new pipe lining and the old 
concrete tunnel was filled with cement grout. 
In addition , an extensive program of grouting 
outside of the original tunnel was undertaken . 
Repairs in this area have now been substan-
tially completed . 
Fig. 6. Corridor Interceptor Tunnel Distress 
The total cost of repairs to the Corridor 
Interceptor within the areas of distress was 
approximately $16 million. Additional funds 
have been spent grouting leaks in the concrete 
lining in other sections of the interceptor. 
This procedure is being undertaken to prevent 
similar failures in other areas of this criti-
cal tunnel. 
FAILURE MECHANISM 
The circumstances surrounding the collapses 
of these three tunnels are somewhat different. 
However, it is believed that the similar failure 
mechanisms contributed to the collapse of each 
of the three tunnels. A thorough investigation 
of the Corridor Interceptor failure was made by 
the u.s. Army Corps of Engineers. Their con-
clusions were as follows: 
a . Seismic activity was not a factor. 
b . Concrete composition, homogeneity, and 
quality were not factors and there was 
no evidence of deterimental chemical 
reactions . 
c. At end of construction, the concrete 
liner contained open construction joints 
and/or cold joints at several locations. 
d. The fine to medium sands, silty sands, 
and silts will pipe through openings 
as narrow as 0 .01 in. under water 
pressures less than 2 psi. 
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e. After construction, the external water 
pressure on the tunnel invert ranged 
from 4 to 8 psi. 
f. Soil piped into the tunnel in varying 
amounts depending on the location of 
the strata of piping soil with respect 
to open construction joints and/or 
cold joints. As material piped into 
the tunnel, the tunnel lost bottom 
and side support. 
g. When loss of support occurred beneath 
the invert, the resulting loading caused 
the structure to crack circumferen-
tially as was observed in Distressed 
Area No. 3. 
h. When loss of support occurred at the 
springline, the resulting nonuniform 
loading caused the resistance of the 
structure to be exceeded and initiated 
and pattern of ovalling and longitu-
dinal cracking and spalling observed 
in all distressed areas. 
Flow of groundwater into sewer tunnels has 
always been considered undesirable because of 
the effect of this addition water flow on 
sewage treatment facilities. 
However, if groundwater flows can carry even 
minute amounts of soil into the tunnel, even-
tual collapse of the tunnel structure should 
be anticipated. Such inflows of soil occur most 
commonly at the tunnel invert since that is 
the point of greatest external water pressure. 
As soil is removed from below the tunnel, there 
is a tendency for the tunnel to deflect down-
ward at that point. This results in the tunnel 
"bending" as a long beam with tension on the 
bottom of the beam. In non-reinforced concrete, 
this tension results in the opening of existing 
cracks and the formation of new cracks. The 
failure then becomes progressive with larger 
cracks leading to greater soil inflow leading 
to larger cracks, until collapse occurs. 
In the case of the Corridor Interceptor and the 
I-696 tunnels, this mechanism appears to have 
been the primary cause of failure. In the case 
of the Romeo Arm Interceptor, external forces 
associated with the shaft construction are 
believed to have initiated the cracking. However, 
it appears that once cracking started, the above 
described mechanism contributed to the rapid and 
progressive collapse that was observed after 
the initial failure was detected. 
GEOTECHNICAL DESIGN CONSIDERATIONS 
The design of any underground facility ought be 
based upon adequate data regarding soil and 
groundwater conditions. In the case of tunnels 
below the groundwater level, it is important to 
evaluate the possibility of soil being carried 
into the tunnel by groundwater inflow. 
During the geotechnical investigation for a 
tunnel project, the design team should obtain 
reliable information on the vertical and hori-
zontal extent of aquifers encountered. Accurate 
information on piezometric levels is also consi-
dered essential, including different piezometric 
levels where multiple aquifers are found. 
If the geotechnical data indicates that the 
tunnel will be even partially within a water-
bearing formation, the grain size distribution 
of the soils within that formation should be 
evaluated by laboratory tests. A significant 
number of tests are generally required to arrive 
at a realistic range of soil properties. In 
stratified soil formations, it may even be 
necessary to run laboratory tests on thin por-
tions of individual soil samples. 
As shown on Figure 7, the soils near invert 
elevation at all three tunnels were fine sands. 
Studies have indicated that granular soils will 
flow through an slotted opening which has a width 
approximately equal to D70 of the soil. For 
the soils on these sites, this relationship 
would result in soil flowing through cracks as 
small as 0.008 inches. 
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Fig. 7. Grain Size Distribution Curves 
Cracks in non-reinforced concrete are not an 
uncommon occurrence. Wherever a concrete pour 
is terminated by a bulkhead, a shrinkage crack 
is likely to develop. For this reason, it is 
recommended that designers specify water stops 
at all construction joints where soil and ground-
water conditions appear likely to permit soil 
inflow. waterstops should be designed to pro-
vide a total seal against water inflow at the 
joint. 
Shrinkage cracks can also occur in between the 
construction joints. These cracks are more 
+ikely to form in high strength (high cement 
factor) concrete. Also, the longer the distance 
between construction joints, the more likely it 
is that significant shrinkage cracks will 
develop. It is therefore recommended that 
concrete strengths be maintained in the lower 
range (3,000 to 4,000 psi) to minimize shrink-
age associated with high cement factors. It is 
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also :ecommended that the length of pour be 
restr1cted to a manageable length (not more than 
120 feet between construction joints for most 
tunnels). 
GEOTECHNICAL CONSTRUCTION CONSIDERATIONS 
It is the belief of the author that tunnel 
design is not completed until tunnel construc-
tion is completed. More than any other struc-
ture, a ~unnel ~ust be in harmony with its 
surround1ng env1ronment (soil and groundwater) 
if it is to survive. Data from test borings 
and other preconstruction investigations gen-
erally gives a fair picture of what the designer 
ought design for. But as the construction 
proceeds, more is learned about subsurface 
conditions. This new data should be checked 
for compatibility with the data which formed 
the basis of the design. 
In order for the designer of a tunnel project 
to do a complete job of tunnel design, it is 
obviously necessary that he or she be involved 
in the project throughout construction. It is 
the authors' belief that the designer, and not 
the contractor, must be responsible for veri-
fying that construction procedures are consis-
tent with design assumptions. The contractor, 
on the other hand, must be responsible for the 
actual construction of the project in accordance 
with the plans and specifications, as modified 
by the designer during the construction process. 
Where tunnel cracking is anticipated due to 
abrupt changes in subsurface conditions, con-
sideration should be given to installation of 
additional waterstopped joints or to rein-
forcing these field-identified areas. 
Last, but not least, tunnel designers ought 
recall the words of many an instructor in Con-
crete Design I, "Concrete cracks!" For this 
reason, it is considered imperative that an 
examination be made of the completed tunnel 
after all dewatering systems have been shut 
down and the groundwater level has returned 
to its static condition. 
If cracks are found to be leaking water, even 
clear water, the construction process is not 
complete. All cracks should be sealed with 
permanent grout materials. For large cracks, 
cement-based grout pumped outside of the con-
crete lining can be effective in sealing cracks. 
For smaller cracks, epoxy grouts have proven 
effective. 
CONCLUSIONS 
It has been said that more can be learned from 
one failure than from 10 successful projects. 
The three failures reported in this paper 
have given tunnel designers and constructors . 
an opportunity to learn. The cost has be~n h1gh 
- more than $40 million for the three proJects 
combined. Fortunately, there was no loss of 
life or serious injury associated with these 
projects. If the lessons learned pr~vent f~ture 
distress in tunnels in equally host1le envlron-
ments, then perhaps it was worth it. 
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